

**RECOGNIZING CATASTROPHIC  
INCIDENT WARNING SIGNS  
IN THE PROCESS INDUSTRIES**

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# **RECOGNIZING CATASTROPHIC INCIDENT WARNING SIGNS IN THE PROCESS INDUSTRIES**

CENTER FOR CHEMICAL PROCESS SAFETY  
of the  
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS

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# CONTENTS

<i>List of Tables</i> .....	<i>xix</i>
<i>List of Figures</i> .....	<i>xxi</i>
<i>Files on the Web Accompanying This Book</i> .....	<i>xxiii</i>
<i>Acknowledgments</i> .....	<i>xxv</i>
<i>Foreword</i> .....	<i>xxvii</i>
<i>Preface</i> .....	<i>xxix</i>

<b>1</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1	Process safety management	3
1.1.1	Identifying process safety management system deficiencies	3
1.2	Normalization of deviance	4
1.3	A strategy for response	5
1.4	Maintaining organizational memory and a healthy sense of vulnerability	7
1.5	Risk Based Process Safety	8
1.6	Our target audience	11
1.7	How to use this book	12
1.8	Case study – Toxic gas release in India	13
<b>2</b>	<b>INCIDENT MECHANICS</b>	<b>17</b>
2.1	Incidents do not just happen	17
2.2	Incident models	17
2.2.1	The difference between incidents and catastrophic incidents	18
2.2.2	The Swiss cheese incident model	19
2.2.3	The bonfire incident analogy	22
2.2.4	The dam incident analogy	22

- 2.2.5 The iceberg incident analogy 23
- 2.2.6 Incident trends and statistics 24
- 2.2.7 Root cause analysis 25
- 2.2.8 Multiple root cause theory 26
- 2.3 Case study – Benzene plant explosion in China 27

**3 LEADERSHIP AND CULTURE 29**

- 3.1 How does leadership affect culture? 29
  - 3.1.1 Communication 30
  - 3.1.2 Operational discipline 30
  - 3.1.3 Process safety culture 31
  - 3.1.4 Process safety versus occupational safety 31
- 3.2 The leadership and culture related warning signs 32
  - 3.2.1 Operating outside the safe operating envelope is accepted 33
  - 3.2.2 Job roles and responsibilities not well defined, confusing, or unclear 34
  - 3.2.3 Negative external complaints 34
  - 3.2.4 Signs of worker fatigue 35
  - 3.2.5 Widespread confusion between occupational safety and process safety 35
  - 3.2.6 Frequent organizational changes 36
  - 3.2.7 Conflict between production goals and safety goals 37
  - 3.2.8 Process safety budget reduced 37
  - 3.2.9 Strained communications between management and workers 37
  - 3.2.10 Overdue process safety action items 38
  - 3.2.11 Slow management response to process safety concerns 39
  - 3.2.12 A perception that management does not listen 39
  - 3.2.13 A lack of trust in field supervision 39
  - 3.2.14 Employee opinion surveys give negative feedback 40

## CONTENTS

ix

3.2.15	Leadership behavior implies that public reputation is more important than process safety	40
3.2.16	Conflicting job priorities	41
3.2.17	Everyone is too busy	41
3.2.18	Frequent changes in priorities	42
3.2.19	Conflict between workers and management concerning working conditions	42
3.2.20	Leaders obviously value activity-based behavior over outcome-based behavior	42
3.2.21	Inappropriate supervisory behavior	43
3.2.22	Supervisors and leaders not formally prepared for management roles	43
3.2.23	A poorly defined chain of command	44
3.2.24	Workers not aware of or not committed to standards	44
3.2.25	Favoritism exists in the organization	45
3.2.26	A high absenteeism rate	45
3.2.27	An employee turnover issue exists	45
3.2.28	Varying shift team operating practices and protocols	46
3.2.29	Frequent changes in ownership	46
3.3	Case study – <i>Challenger</i> space shuttle explosion in the United States	47

## 4 TRAINING AND COMPETENCY

49

4.1	What is effective training, and how is competency measured?	49
4.1.1	Three basic levels of training	50
4.1.2	Competency assessment	51
4.2	The training and competency related warning signs	51
4.2.1	No training on possible catastrophic events and their characteristics	52
4.2.2	Poor training on hazards of the process operation and the materials involved	53



## RECOGNIZING CATASTROPHIC INCIDENT WARNING SIGNS

4.2.3	An ineffective or nonexistent formal training program	53
4.2.4	Inadequate training on facility chemical processes	54
4.2.5	No formal training on process safety systems	55
4.2.6	No competency register to indicate the level of competency achieved by each worker	56
4.2.7	Inadequate formal training on process-specific equipment operation or maintenance	56
4.2.8	Frequent performance errors apparent	56
4.2.9	Signs of chaos during process upsets or unusual events	57
4.2.10	Workers unfamiliar with facility equipment or procedures	57
4.2.11	Frequent process upsets	58
4.2.12	Training sessions canceled or postponed	59
4.2.13	Procedures performed with a check-the-box mentality	59
4.2.14	Long-term workers have not attended recent training	60
4.2.15	Training records are not current or are incomplete	60
4.2.16	Poor training attendance is tolerated	61
4.2.17	Training materials not suitable or instructors not competent	61
4.2.18	Inappropriate use or overuse of computer-based training	62
4.3	Case study – Gas plant vapor cloud explosion in Australia	62

## **5 PROCESS SAFETY INFORMATION 65**

5.1	Critical information to identify hazards and manage risk	65
5.2	The process safety information related warning signs	66
5.2.1	Piping and instrument diagrams do not reflect current field conditions	67
5.2.2	Incomplete documentation about safety systems	68
5.2.3	Inadequate documentation of chemical hazards	69

CONTENTS		<b>xi</b>
5.2.4	Low precision and accuracy of process safety information documentation other than piping and instrument diagrams	70
5.2.5	Material safety data sheets or equipment data sheets not current	70
5.2.6	Process safety information not readily available	71
5.2.7	Incomplete electrical / hazardous area classification drawings	72
5.2.8	Poor equipment labeling or tagging	72
5.2.9	Inconsistent drawing formats and protocols	73
5.2.10	Problems with document control for process safety information	74
5.2.11	No formal ownership established for process safety information	75
5.2.12	No process alarm management system	75
5.3	Case study – Batch still fire and explosion in the UK	76
<b>6</b>	<b>PROCEDURES</b>	<b>79</b>
6.1	Safe and consistent operation	79
6.2	The procedure related warning signs	81
6.2.1	Procedures do not address all equipment required	81
6.2.2	Procedures do not maintain a safe operating envelope	82
6.2.3	Operators appear unfamiliar with procedures or how to use them	83
6.2.4	A significant number of events resulting in auto initiated trips and shutdowns	84
6.2.5	No system to gauge whether procedures have been followed	85
6.2.6	Facility access procedures not consistently applied or enforced	86
6.2.7	Inadequate shift turnover communication	87
6.2.8	Poor quality shift logs	88
6.2.9	Failure to follow company procedures is tolerated	88

- 6.2.10 Chronic problems with the work permit system 89
- 6.2.11 Inadequate or poor quality procedures 91
- 6.2.12 No system for determining which activities need written procedures 92
- 6.2.13 No established administrative procedure and style guide for writing and revising procedures 93
- 6.3 Case study – Nuclear plant meltdown and explosion in the Ukraine 95

**7 ASSET INTEGRITY**

- 7.1 Systematic implementation 97
- 7.2 The asset integrity related warning signs 99
  - 7.2.1 Operation continues when safeguards are known to be impaired 100
  - 7.2.2 Overdue equipment inspections 100
  - 7.2.3 Relief valve testing overdue 101
  - 7.2.4 No formal maintenance program 102
  - 7.2.5 A run-to-failure philosophy exists 102
  - 7.2.6 Maintenance deferred until next budget cycle 103
  - 7.2.7 Preventive maintenance activities reduced to save money 103
  - 7.2.8 Broken or defective equipment not tagged and still in service 103
  - 7.2.9 Multiple and repetitive mechanical failures 104
  - 7.2.10 Corrosion and equipment deterioration evident 105
  - 7.2.11 A high frequency of leaks 105
  - 7.2.12 Installed equipment and hardware do not meet good engineering practices 106
  - 7.2.13 Improper application of equipment and hardware allowed 107
  - 7.2.14 Facility firewater used to cool process equipment 107
  - 7.2.15 Alarm and instrument management not adequately addressed 108

<b>CONTENTS</b>		<b>xiii</b>
7.2.16	Bypassed alarms and safety systems	108
7.2.17	Process is operating with out-of-service safety instrumented systems and no risk assessment or management of change	109
7.2.18	Critical safety systems not functioning properly or not tested	109
7.2.19	Nuisance alarms and trips	110
7.2.20	Inadequate practices for establishing equipment criticality	110
7.2.21	Working on equipment that is in service	111
7.2.22	Temporary or substandard repairs are prevalent	111
7.2.23	Inconsistent preventive maintenance implementation	112
7.2.24	Equipment repair records not up to date	112
7.2.25	Chronic problems with the maintenance planning system	113
7.2.26	No formal process to manage equipment deficiencies	113
7.2.27	Maintenance jobs not adequately closed out	114
7.3	Case study – Refinery naphtha fire in the United States	114
<b>8</b>	<b>ANALYZING RISK AND MANAGING CHANGE</b>	<b>117</b>
8.1	Risk management	117
8.1.1	Hazard identification and risk analysis	117
8.1.2	The definitions of hazard and risk	117
8.1.3	Management of change	119
8.1.4	What is your role in risk management?	120
8.2	The risk analysis and management of change related warning signs	121
8.2.1	Weak process hazard analysis practices	122
8.2.2	Out-of-service emergency standby systems	123
8.2.3	Poor process hazard analysis action item follow-up	123

8.2.4	Management of change system used only for major changes	124
8.2.5	Backlog of incomplete management of change items	124
8.2.6	Excessive delay in closing management of change action items to completion	124
8.2.7	Organizational changes not subjected to management of change	125
8.2.8	Frequent changes or disruptions in operating plan	125
8.2.9	Risk assessments conducted to support decisions already made	126
8.2.10	A sense that <i>we always do it this way</i>	126
8.2.11	Management unwilling to consider change	127
8.2.12	Management of change item review and approval lack structure and rigor	127
8.2.13	Failure to recognize operational deviations and initiate management of change	128
8.2.14	Original facility design used for current modifications	128
8.2.15	Temporary changes made permanent without management of change	128
8.2.16	Operating creep exists	129
8.2.17	Process hazard analysis revalidations are not performed or are inadequate	129
8.2.18	Instruments bypassed without adequate management of change	129
8.2.19	Little or no corporate guidance on acceptable risk ranking methods	130
8.2.20	Risk registry is poorly prepared, nonexistent, or unavailable	131
8.2.21	No baseline risk profile for a facility	131
8.2.22	Security protocols not enforced consistently	132
8.3	Case study – Cyclohexane explosion in the UK	132

<b>9</b>	<b>AUDITS</b>	<b>139</b>
9.1	Audits support operational excellence	139
9.1.1	Audit team characteristics	139
9.1.2	Internal and external audits	140
9.1.3	Audit protocols	140
9.1.4	Addressing audit results	141
9.2	The audit related warning signs	141
9.2.1	Repeat findings occur in subsequent audits	142
9.2.2	Audits often lack field verification	142
9.2.3	Findings from previous audits are still open	143
9.2.4	Audits are not reviewed with management	143
9.2.5	Inspections or audits result in significant findings	144
9.2.6	Regulatory fines and citations have been received	144
9.2.7	Negative external complaints are common	145
9.2.8	Audits seem focused on good news	145
9.2.9	Audit reports are not communicated to all affected employees	146
9.2.10	Corporate process safety management guidance does not match a site's culture and resources	146
9.3	Case study – Chemical warehouse fire in the UK	147
<b>10</b>	<b>LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE</b>	<b>149</b>
10.1	Methods for continuous improvement	149
10.1.1	Incident investigation	149
10.1.2	Measurement and metrics	150
10.1.3	External incidents	150
10.1.4	Management review and continuous improvement	150
10.2	The learning from experience warning signs	151
10.2.1	Failure to learn from previous incidents	151
10.2.2	Frequent leaks or spills	152

10.2.3	Frequent process upsets or off-specification product	153
10.2.4	High contractor incident rates	153
10.2.5	Abnormal instrument readings not recorded or investigated	154
10.2.6	Equipment failures widespread and frequent	154
10.2.7	Incident trend reports reflect only injuries or significant incidents	155
10.2.8	Minor incidents are not reported	155
10.2.9	Failure to report near misses and substandard conditions	156
10.2.10	Superficial incident investigations result in improper findings	156
10.2.11	Incident reports downplay impact	157
10.2.12	Environmental performance does not meet regulations or company targets	158
10.2.13	Incident trends and patterns apparent but not well tracked or analyzed	158
10.2.14	Frequent activation of safety systems	159
10.3	Case study – Space shuttle <i>Columbia</i> incident in the United States	159

## 11 PHYSICAL WARNING SIGNS

**163**

11.1	The everyday things matter	163
11.2	The physical warning signs	164
11.2.1	Worker or community complaints of unusual odors	164
11.2.2	Equipment or structures show physical damage	164
11.2.3	Equipment vibration outside acceptable ranges	165
11.2.4	Obvious leaks and spills	165
11.2.5	Dust buildup on flat surfaces and in buildings	166
11.2.6	Inconsistent or incorrect use of personal protective equipment	167
11.2.7	Missing or defective safety equipment	168

<b>CONTENTS</b>	<b>xvii</b>
11.2.8 Uncontrolled traffic movement within the facility	168
11.2.9 Open and uncontrolled sources of ignition	169
11.2.10 Project trailers located close to process facilities	169
11.2.11 Plugged sewers and drainage systems	169
11.2.12 Poor housekeeping accepted by workers and management	169
11.2.13 Permanent and temporary working platforms not protected or monitored	170
11.2.14 Open electrical panels and conduits	170
11.2.15 Condensation apparent on inner walls and ceilings of process buildings	170
11.2.16 Loose bolts and unsecured equipment components	171
11.3 Case study – Resin plant dust explosion in the United States	172
<b>12 A CALL TO ACTION</b>	<b>175</b>
12.1 Actions that you can take now for each warning sign	176
12.1.1 Periodic employee participation in analyzing warning signs	176
12.1.2 Use the warning signs as part of your next process safety audit	177
12.2 A simple plan to consider for rigorous implementation and follow-up	177
12.2.1 Perform an initial warning signs survey	177
12.2.2 Build warning sign analysis into your management system	178
12.2.3 Use the new system and track related action items	178
12.2.4 Evaluate effectiveness in the next compliance audit	179
12.2.5 Maintain vigilance against recurring warning signs	179
12.3 Actions to consider	180
12.3.1 Senior management	180
12.3.2 Managers	181



RECOGNIZING CATASTROPHIC INCIDENT WARNING SIGNS

12.3.3	Supervisors	181
12.3.4	Using incident warning signs for operations leader training	182
12.3.5	All employees	183
12.4	Summary	183
12.5	Case study – Oil platform explosion and fire in the North Sea	183

**APPENDIX A – INCIDENT WARNING SIGN SELF-ASSESSMENT TOOL** **187**

**APPENDIX B – COMPOSITE LIST OF CATASTROPHIC INCIDENT WARNING SIGNS** **199**

**REFERENCES AND SELECTED REGULATIONS** **205**

**ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS** **213**

**GLOSSARY** **215**

**INDEX** **221**

# LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1-1	Key Questions for Warning Sign Incident Investigations	7
TABLE 1-2	Risk Based Process Safety's (RBPS) Four Pillars and Twenty Elements	9
TABLE 1-3	Catastrophic Incident by Element Analysis	10

# LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1-1 A Strategy for Response	5
Figure 2-1 Safety Pyramid	19
Figure 2-2 Swiss Cheese Model of Barriers to Consequences	20
Figure 2-3 Remove the Fuel	22
Figure 2-4 The Dam Model	23
Figure 2-5 The Iceberg Model	24
Figure 2-6 Incident Trends	25
Figure 2-7 Simplified Logic Tree Root Cause Analysis	26
Figure 2-8 The Jilin Explosion Aftermath	28
Figure 8-1 The Nypro Explosion Aftermath	133

# **FILES ON THE WEB ACCOMPANYING THIS BOOK**

**Access the incident warning sign self-assessment tool and a list of the warning signs using the Microsoft Explorer Web browser at**

**<http://www.aiche.org/ccps/publications/IWSMaterial.aspx>**

**Password: IWS2010**