By Demange G. (ed.), Wooders M. (ed.)

ISBN-10: 0511109865

ISBN-13: 9780511109867

ISBN-10: 0521842719

ISBN-13: 9780521842716

Large and various levels of actions are performed inside and through prepared teams of people, together with political, financial and social actions. those actions have lately develop into a topic of severe curiosity in economics and video game thought. a number of the themes investigated during this assortment are versions of networks of energy and privilege, alternate networks, co-authorship networks, buyer-seller networks with differentiated items, and networks of scientific innovation and the variation of recent details. different themes are social norms on punctuality, golf equipment and the availability of membership items and public items, examine and improvement and collusive alliances between firms, and foreign alliances and buying and selling agreements. whereas fairly fresh, the literature on video game theoretic stories of staff formation in economics is already mammoth. This quantity presents an creation to this crucial literature on game-theoretic remedies of occasions with networks, golf equipment, and coalitions, together with a few purposes.

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Extra resources for Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions

Sample text

For instance, if A Survey of Network Formation Models: Stability and Efficiency 19 v({12, 23,13}) = 0 = v({13}), then 2 is essential to the network and may receive a large allocation. If, on the other hand, v(g ) = 1 for all networks, then 2’s role is not particularly special. This information can be relevant, especially in bargaining situations, which is why the allocation rule is allowed to depend on it. I return to discuss this in more detail below. Before moving on, I note two properties of allocation rules that will come up repeatedly in what follows.

The greater the number of players who are linked, the greater the potential gains from trade but with a diminishing return to the number of players added. Moreover, there is an externality in that the link is costly to the players who are directly involved, but it may benefit other players through the improved flow of goods through the network. The nonexistence of a pairwise-stable network is due to these external effects. Players near the end of a “line” network of more than two wish to sever the link to the end players because that link is more costly to maintain than it is directly beneficial to the players involved.

Players (simultaneously) announce which other players they wish to be connected to. If s ∈ S1 × · × Sn is the set of strategies played, then link i j forms if and only if both j ∈ si and i ∈ s j . This game has the advantage of being very simple and rather directly capturing the idea of forming links. Unfortunately, it generally has a large multiplicity of Nash equilibria. For instance, si = ∅, for all i is always a Nash equilibrium regardless of what the payoffs to various networks are. The idea is that no player suggests any links under the correct expectation that no players will reciprocate.

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Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions by Demange G. (ed.), Wooders M. (ed.)


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