By Esther A. Solomon

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Fire ) of the cognition p/oduced by fallacious causes is different from the reai fire, so this cognition pertains to ' atattva ', and thus the definition is not too wide. This is not convincing. Though it may have a different object from the point of view of the particular fire still it has ' tattva ' as its object from the point of view of jati or generality and so the definition is certainly too wide. îs Knowledge Possible ? 563 It may b e further argued that if the particular ( viz. fire ) as it is revealed in this inferential cognition is different from the real fire, then the generality also must be different from the real fireness, otherwise the generality will drag along with it the real particular which resides as related to one of its aspects or portions.

Or does non-incoherence signify the unfailing or invariable existence of the causal factors that gave rise to i t ? 2 2 If it means 'taking us to just anything', then the cognition of kesonduka (woolly mass seen by pressing the eyes with the fingers) or of two moons also should have to be regarded as non-incoherent. If it be said to mean 'taking us to the object that is revealed', then inferential cognition could never be said be non-incoherent, as it does not take us to the object that is revealed What is revealed in inferential cognition is the shape of the samanya (universal) and it being unreal (in the Buddhist view) could never be reached.

The cognition of silver in nacre is also cognition of svarupa. The substrate—nacre—and silverness are both 'svarupa' and it is but proper that the relation appearing between them (-samaväya or inherence) is also svarupa. It may be urged that it is right that samaväya is svarupa, but it does not belong to silverness in respect of nacre because silverness is not inherent in nacre. But this is not proper. It may not be there, yet this does not prevent samaväya from being svarupa. Devadatta may not be in the house, but this does not mean that he is not lsvaruva\ It may be argued that svarupa alone is not tattva, but svarupa as associated with time and space in which it is apprehended i£ tattva.

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Indian Dialectics: Methods of Philosophical Discussion Vol II by Esther A. Solomon

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