By Burhanettin Tatar

ISBN-10: 1565181212

ISBN-13: 9781565181212

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Extra info for Interpretation and the Problem of the Intention of the Author: H.-G. Gadamer Vs. E.D. Hirsch

Example text

The first essential in interpreting him here is to give due prominence to the Investigations' explicit conception of the genesis of philosophical problems and of proper philosophical method. g. Investigations, pt. II, §ix: "a cry, which cannot be called a description, which is more primitive than any description, for all that serves as a description of the inner life, A cry is not a description. But there are transitions. And the words "I am afraid" may approximate more, or less, to being a cry.

The same is evidently true in Spades of psychological items other than sensations. This threatens a worrying dilution of the key notion of expression. That's a worry that might, I suppose, be worked on. But the next one seems decisive. Suppose a highly trained secret agent under torture resolutely gives no ordinary behavioural sign of pain. However, his torturers are men of discernment, with subtle instruments, who know full well of his agony, none the less: they know the characteristic signs —patterns on the electroencephalograph, raised heart rate, activation of reflexes in the eye, changes in surface skin chemistry, etc.

How can a genuine statement be entailed by a mere expression? (iv) 'I am in pain' embeds like any normal assertoric content in logical constructions such as negation and the conditional. 'It's not the case that I am in pain' and 'If I am in pain, I'd better take an aspirin' are syntactically perfectly acceptable constructions. But how can a mere expression, contrast: assertion, be denied? And doesn't the antecedent of a conditional have to be understood as the hypothesis that something is the case?

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Interpretation and the Problem of the Intention of the Author: H.-G. Gadamer Vs. E.D. Hirsch by Burhanettin Tatar


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