By Professor Andrew Reisner, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
Philosophers have lengthy been fascinated by what we all know and the way we all know it. more and more, even though, a similar query has received prominence in philosophical dialogue: what may still we think and why? This quantity brings jointly twelve new essays that tackle diversified elements of this query. The essays research foundational questions about purposes for trust, and use new study on purposes for trust to handle conventional epistemological matters corresponding to wisdom, justification and perceptually got ideals. This publication could be of curiosity to philosophers engaged on epistemology, theoretical cause, rationality, conception and ethics. it is going to even be of curiosity to cognitive scientists and psychologists who desire to achieve deeper perception into normative questions about trust and data.
Read or Download Reasons for Belief PDF
Similar epistemology books
This booklet increases questions about the character of philosophy through reading the resource and value of 1 principal philosophical challenge: how do we comprehend whatever concerning the global round us? Stroud discusses and criticizes the perspectives of such philosophers as Descartes, Kant, J. L. Austin, G. E. Moore, R.
Emily Grosholz bargains an unique research of demonstration in arithmetic and technological know-how, reading the way it works and why it's persuasive. concentrating on geometrical demonstration, she exhibits the jobs that illustration and ambiguity play in mathematical discovery. She offers a variety of case experiences in mechanics, topology, algebra, common sense, and chemistry, from old Greece to the current day, yet focusing quite at the 17th and 20th centuries.
First released in 1987. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa corporation.
The sensitivity precept is a compelling inspiration in epistemology and is sometimes characterised as an important situation for wisdom. This number of 13 new essays constitutes a state of the art dialogue of this crucial precept. many of the essays construct on and develop sensitivity-based money owed of data and provide novel defences of these debts.
- The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology
- Norms, Naturalism and Epistemology: The case for science without norms
- Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law (European Academy of Legal Theory Series)
- The Origins of Aristotelian Science
Extra info for Reasons for Belief
Likewise, my belief that there is an even number of dust specks on my desk can be well supported by epistemic reasons, even if nothing of value would be promoted by forming such a belief. Nevertheless, I will argue that there is a broadly teleological account compatible with these claims. 4 two kinds of reasons for belief Normally, reasons for belief are taken to be reasons for believing that some particular proposition, or body of propositions, is true. But this is not the only kind of reasons relating to beliefs.
15 I am assuming that there are no non-evidential reasons for the beliefs in question. It is worth noting that one can set up parallel bootstrapping objections for principles of practical rationality. Indeed, this was Bratman’s original use of the objection. 40 andrew reisner It is worth noting that not all normative requirements that govern mental states are rational requirements. But it may be difficult to develop a precise set of criteria for distinguishing between normative requirements on mental states that capture a requirement of rationality and those that do not.
In particular, this chapter will look at the more specific matter of whether there is reason to be theoretically rational. I shall argue that there is very strong reason to be theoretically rational. Unfortunately, answering the question about theoretical rationality does not settle questions about the normativity of practical rationality, but I shall outline in a speculative way how the considerations raised here in favor of the normativity of theoretical rationality might be used to show that the requirements of practical rationality are normative.
Reasons for Belief by Professor Andrew Reisner, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen