By Christopher Peacocke
Peacocke argues that the propositional content material of psychological states can in simple terms be understood when it comes to perceptual event and exhibits that now not all event is representational.
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Additional info for Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and their Relations
In the case of a portrait, what picks it out uniquely as the representing vehicle is the interpretation placed on it by an observer. For a fuller discussion of this response to Goodman's objection see Files (1996). Notes Toward a Structuralist Theory of Mental Representation 9 Resemblance is a fairly unconstrained relationship, because objects or systems of objects can resemble each other in a huge variety of ways, and to various different degrees. However, one might hope to make some progress by starting with simple cases of resemblance, examining their possible significance for mental representation, and then turning to more complex cases.
But the story about the third relatum namely, interpretation m is different in the case of mental representation. If we apply the account we adopted in the non-mental case, and treat interpretation in terms of a cognitive subject thinking about a represented object, we violate the naturalism constraint by von Eckardt actually uses the terms representation bearer, representational object and interpretant to describe the three relata implicated in representation. g. see O'Brien & Opie 1999). 6 Notes Toward a Structuralist Theory of Mental Representation 5 interjecting a state that is already representational.
Structural resemblance thus appears to ground representation in any connectionist computational system. Accordingly, if the brain is a network of connectionist networks then mental content is governed by the structural properties of neural networks, and semantic properties are finally brought home to roost in the mental representing vehicles themselves. Naturally, this is what any advocate of the structuralist theory of mental representation would hope to find. Standard approaches take the intrinsic properties of representing vehicles to be inconsequential, except in so far as these properties are consistent with the causal relations in which these vehicles are caught up.
Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and their Relations by Christopher Peacocke