By David Christensen, Jennifer Lackey
David Christensen, Jennifer Lackey (eds.)
The Epistemology of war of words brings jointly essays from a dozen philosophers at the epistemic importance of war of words; all yet one of many essays are new. Questions mentioned contain: whilst (if ever) does the war of words of others require a rational agent to revise her ideals? Do 'conciliatory' money owed, on which brokers are required to revise considerably, be afflicted by deadly difficulties of self-defeat, given the war of words approximately war of words? what's the importance of confrontation approximately philosophical issues specifically? How does the epistemology of confrontation relate to broader epistemic theorizing? Does the elevated value of a number of disagreeing brokers rely on their being self reliant of each other?
John Hawthorne and Amia Srinivasan, Thomas Kelly, and Brian Weatherson all weigh in with assaults on conciliatory perspectives or defenses of non-conciliatory methods. David Christensen and Stewart Cohen absorb the other facet of the controversy. Bryan Frances, Sanford Goldberg, and Ernest Sosa speak about one of those confrontation that might be of specific hindrance to so much readers of this publication: war of words approximately philosophy. And Robert Audi, Jonathan Kvanvig, and Jennifer Lackey take on a few basic theoretical concerns that undergo on disagreement.
The philosophers represented right here contain a few who've contributed actively to the war of words literature already, in addition to a few who're exploring the difficulty for the 1st time. Their paintings is helping to deepen and extend our realizing of a few epistemic phenomena which are imperative to any considerate believer's engagement with different believers.
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Extra resources for The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays
One might hold that facts about one’s evidence provide some reason to do this or that, but that facts about what one takes one’s evidence to be, as well as facts about what habits a course of action inculcates, also provide reason to do this or that. And one might hope, moreover, that there exists, at least in many cases, a fact about what one has ‘all things considered’ reason to do. Less committedly, one might envisage an ordering source that directly ranks acts in terms of comparative praiseworthiness, perhaps without trying to give any sort of quasi-reductive account of what grounds these facts of relative praiseworthiness.
As Richard Feldman puts it: Consider those cases in which the reasonable thing to think is that another person, every bit as sensible, serious, and careful as oneself, has reviewed the same information as oneself and has come to a contrary conclusion to one’s own . . An honest description of the situation acknowledges its symmetry. . In those cases, I think, the skeptical conclusion is the reasonable one: it is not the case that both points of view are reasonable, and it is not the case that 2 Cf.
Disagreement without transparency: some bleak thoughts 29 Where does this leave us? One kind of reaction to all this is to despair of any cogent treatment of non-ideal cases. ) And we might contend that for non-ideal creatures there is no stable measure of epistemic praise and blame, and that associated ‘ought’ claims are not ultimately coherent. 47 Another kind of response finds fault in the attempt to formalize praiseworthiness in the guise of KDN-inspired expected utility. One might hold that facts about one’s evidence provide some reason to do this or that, but that facts about what one takes one’s evidence to be, as well as facts about what habits a course of action inculcates, also provide reason to do this or that.
The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays by David Christensen, Jennifer Lackey