By Erik J. Olsson (ed.)
This ebook is an in depth, self-contained, up to date learn of Lehrer's epistemological paintings. masking all significant features, it comprises unique contributions via one of the most uncommon experts within the box, outgoing from the most recent, considerably revised model of Lehrer's conception. All uncomplicated principles are defined in an introductory bankruptcy. Lehrer's vast replies in a last bankruptcy supply targeted entry to his present epistemological considering.
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Additional resources for The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer
When justification attaches to the believing itself rather than merely to the content of what is believed, it is because one holds the belief in question on the basis of the evidence. , one may have the evidence but believe for different reasons. This distinction is important for at least two reasons. First, only doxastically justified beliefs are candidates for knowledge, on any theory which requires justification for knowledge. Propositional justification is a step in the right direction, but if one's believing itself is not justified, one cannot have met the justificatory requirements for knowledge.
2. Lehrer's defense of coherentism relies on the idea that coherentism comports better with the nonsupervenience of the epistemic. And he believes this to be so in virtue of something else he believes: namely, that there is no "account" of the epistemic in nonepistemic terms. " Be that as it may, there is now this further question: Why should we suppose that no foundationalist status could be akin to coherence in failing to have any adequate "account" in nonepistemic terms? Take clarity and distinctness as the relevant foundationalist status.
Most people, I assume, would simply insist that they can tell, or else very quickly get into a quite inadequate (and probably false) explanation as to how they can tell. Let me be clear: The point I am making here is not that Mr. Truetemp knows. On the contrary, I think that he does not know, and below I will offer my own explanation regarding why he does not know. My point, rather, is that Lehrer's coherence theory is faced with the dilemma set out above. Depending on how one interprets Lehrer's conditions for coherence and knowledge, either a) Truetemp has the requisite true acceptances in his evaluation system, in which case he knows, or b) he does not, in which case neither do ordinary perceivers, and so they don't know.
The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer by Erik J. Olsson (ed.)