By Bruce W. Hauptli

ISBN-10: 0812692837

ISBN-13: 9780812692839

Does reliance on cause require an unreasonable religion in cause? within the Reasonableness of cause, Professor Hauptli argues that naturalized epistemology permits us to give an explanation for the reasonableness of the rationalist dedication. analyzing diversified different types of rationalism in flip, the writer exposes their boundaries. conventional (justificatory) rationalists are certainly stuck in a paradox, and people modern rationalists who easily verify that we must always be rational with no trying to argue for it (kerygmatic rationalists, as Hauptli phrases them) can't effectively shield rationalism. one other institution of rationalists (realistic rationalists) manages to prevent the anomaly which besets justificatory rationalism yet, Hauptli indicates, this method rests on a maxim as arbitrary as that of the kerygmatic rationalists. What of naturalized epistemology? A dialogue of a number of naturalistic orientations yields the excellence among descriptive and explanatory naturalism. whereas descriptive naturalists are diminished to delivering not more than an arbitrary dedication, explanatory naturalists can offer a passable reaction to the demanding situations raised by way of conceptual range and alter. they provide a treatment argument, designed to teach how an knowing of our roles as theory-holders and theory-changers undercuts a lot of the strength of conventional demanding situations to rationality. Explanatory naturalism can effectively protect the reasonableness of reason.

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Additional resources for The Reasonableness of Reason: Explaining Rationality Naturalistically

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One might hold that facts about one’s evidence provide some reason to do this or that, but that facts about what one takes one’s evidence to be, as well as facts about what habits a course of action inculcates, also provide reason to do this or that. And one might hope, moreover, that there exists, at least in many cases, a fact about what one has ‘all things considered’ reason to do. Less committedly, one might envisage an ordering source that directly ranks acts in terms of comparative praiseworthiness, perhaps without trying to give any sort of quasi-reductive account of what grounds these facts of relative praiseworthiness.

As Richard Feldman puts it: Consider those cases in which the reasonable thing to think is that another person, every bit as sensible, serious, and careful as oneself, has reviewed the same information as oneself and has come to a contrary conclusion to one’s own . . An honest description of the situation acknowledges its symmetry. . In those cases, I think, the skeptical conclusion is the reasonable one: it is not the case that both points of view are reasonable, and it is not the case that 2 Cf.

Disagreement without transparency: some bleak thoughts 29 Where does this leave us? One kind of reaction to all this is to despair of any cogent treatment of non-ideal cases. ) And we might contend that for non-ideal creatures there is no stable measure of epistemic praise and blame, and that associated ‘ought’ claims are not ultimately coherent. 47 Another kind of response finds fault in the attempt to formalize praiseworthiness in the guise of KDN-inspired expected utility. One might hold that facts about one’s evidence provide some reason to do this or that, but that facts about what one takes one’s evidence to be, as well as facts about what habits a course of action inculcates, also provide reason to do this or that.

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The Reasonableness of Reason: Explaining Rationality Naturalistically by Bruce W. Hauptli


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