By Bruce W. Hauptli
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Additional resources for The Reasonableness of Reason: Explaining Rationality Naturalistically
One might hold that facts about one’s evidence provide some reason to do this or that, but that facts about what one takes one’s evidence to be, as well as facts about what habits a course of action inculcates, also provide reason to do this or that. And one might hope, moreover, that there exists, at least in many cases, a fact about what one has ‘all things considered’ reason to do. Less committedly, one might envisage an ordering source that directly ranks acts in terms of comparative praiseworthiness, perhaps without trying to give any sort of quasi-reductive account of what grounds these facts of relative praiseworthiness.
As Richard Feldman puts it: Consider those cases in which the reasonable thing to think is that another person, every bit as sensible, serious, and careful as oneself, has reviewed the same information as oneself and has come to a contrary conclusion to one’s own . . An honest description of the situation acknowledges its symmetry. . In those cases, I think, the skeptical conclusion is the reasonable one: it is not the case that both points of view are reasonable, and it is not the case that 2 Cf.
Disagreement without transparency: some bleak thoughts 29 Where does this leave us? One kind of reaction to all this is to despair of any cogent treatment of non-ideal cases. ) And we might contend that for non-ideal creatures there is no stable measure of epistemic praise and blame, and that associated ‘ought’ claims are not ultimately coherent. 47 Another kind of response finds fault in the attempt to formalize praiseworthiness in the guise of KDN-inspired expected utility. One might hold that facts about one’s evidence provide some reason to do this or that, but that facts about what one takes one’s evidence to be, as well as facts about what habits a course of action inculcates, also provide reason to do this or that.
The Reasonableness of Reason: Explaining Rationality Naturalistically by Bruce W. Hauptli