By Louis P. Pojman
Compact but extra accomplished than related texts, WHAT do we be aware of? analyzes the imperative issues of fact, justification starting from skepticism to spiritual trust. Written within the author's pleasant and conversational type with no pointless jargon, the textual content makes the subject material extra available and welcoming to scholars.
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Additional info for What Can We Know?: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge
But I may not even understand the concept of a molecule (as most people before the nineteenth century did not), let alone believe that the sun is made up of them. Knowledge is not closed under entailment. But (a) adds a K operator to the second conjunct. If I know that the sun is a star and know that the sun being a star entails that it is made up of molecules, then I know that the sun is made up of molecules. If Nozick's argument needed only (b) as a premise, it would be a sound argument, but since it needs (a) it seems unsound.
How do we know whether the possibility of a mule being painted to look like a zebra is relevant to picking out zebras? If I believe in demons who intervene in human affairs, does the possibility of a demon causing these animals to look like zebras become a relevant alternative? This leads to a second problem. 2. Contextualism relativizes knowledge in a way that may be unduly subjective. What you know may depend on whether or not you have certain background beliefs. I may be said to know that the zebra in front of us is truly a zebra because I can just barely distinguish it from painted mules and because I don't believe in demons.
In order to meet condition (4), we must be able to make relevant discriminations. 52 CHAPTER 3 Modern Skepticism According to this theory, conditions (3) and (4) take the place of the standard condition that S must be justified in believing p (see chapter 5). Since knowledge is defined as truth-tracking, it only matters whether the belief in question is true, would not have been believed if it weren't true, and would remain true in slightly altered circumstances. The question arises: What would lead Nozick to say that you can know p and know p g, but not know q?
What Can We Know?: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge by Louis P. Pojman